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Confronting the Crisis
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The euro crisis has not gone away on holiday. In fact, it continues to 
generate a never-ending string of horrific headlines. Where is it all going 
to end? In this article we describe the proposed remedies that are 
currently being discussed, and what blue and red eurobonds, euro bills, 
FIRE and the debt redemption fund can actually achieve.
Dark clouds are once again piling up over 
Greece. Its reform process is moving ahead at a 
very sluggish pace, and there has been another 
bout of speculation about an imminent “Grexit.” 
Furthermore, the situation in Spain has taken 
a turn for the worse. At the end of June Spain 
was granted loans amounting to €100 billion 
in order to enable it to prop up its ailing banks, 
but this has not been enough to defuse the situ-
ation. It is becoming increasingly clear that, in 
spite of its austerity and reform programmes, 
Italy will not be able to weather the crisis on 
its own. A safety net amounting to €700 billion 
is not going to be enough for the EU’s third-
largest economy. And in any case, it has not 
as yet come into force. The fact of the matter 
is that the eurozone is waiting for a ruling by 
I
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, which 
has until the middle of September to decide 
whether or not the ESM is in compliance with 
the Basic Law.
The financial markets have reacted in a nervous 
and at times panic-stricken manner. Investors 
are withdrawing increasingly large amounts of 
capital from the crisis-ridden countries. Stock 
prices are plummeting. And recently the euro 
hit a new 2-year low against the dollar.
One might be forgiven for thinking that so 
far the politicians and their attempts at cri-
sis management have simply accelerated the 
downward spiral. At any rate, the trust of the 
financial markets has not yet been regained, at 
least not in the long term. After umpteen euro 
crisis summits the heads of state and govern-
ment have not come up with a way of breaking 
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II
Not all bonds are the same
So far the German government in particular has 
flatly rejected the communitarization of debt. 
In the public debate on the subject “eurobonds” 
and terms such as “debt union” or “transfer 
union” have become political battle cries, and 
they have created a veritable minefield. All this 
obscures the fact that a number of very differ-
ent models have now been developed, and they 
are not concerned to organize joint and several 
liability for all and sundry, but to remove the 
pressure exerted by the financial markets on 
the countries suffering from a debt burden. 
These countries obviously need both the will 
and the time to introduce budget consolidation 
and structural reforms.
out of the vicious circle of sovereign debt crisis, 
banking crisis and economic crisis. And one 
is inclined to agree with the economists who 
from the very beginning were in favour of the 
“big bazooka” or “Big Bertha”. They believe that 
the European Central Bank (ECB) should be 
allowed to follow the example of the US Federal 
Reserve (FED) and have the right to keep print-
ing money for as long as it wants. As a result 
doubts about the solvency of eurozone states 
and their banks would be nipped in the bud. 
Similar ideas were behind demands to commu-
nitarize sovereign debt in the eurozone and to 
issue joint government bonds (or eurobonds) for 
refinancing purposes. Joint and several liability 
for credit defaults is intended to be a firewall 
which will prevent financial market specula-
tion against individual eurozone states and to 
bring down interest rates to an acceptable level.
A Vicious Circle
The banking, sovereign debt and macroeconomic crises create a vicious circle
Source: German Council of Economic Experts © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Government bank 
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The most important types of eurobond are 
described below. In essence they differ in two 
ways, that is:
1.  The extent to which national bonds are   
going to be replaced by European bonds; and
2.  The guarantees which will be given for 
these bonds, i.e. whether the member states 
will assume joint and several liability for the 
new joint sovereign debt,   or only partial liabil-
ity, as in the case of the ESM.
They also differ with regard to the speed with 
which they can be deployed to combat the   
crisis. Joint and several liability has hitherto 
come up against the no bail-out clause enshrined 
in the European treaties (Art. 125 TFEU). In 
order to enable EU countries to assume such 
liability, the EU would have to amend the Treaty 
of Lisbon with the help of the ordinary revision   
procedure. This would also apply to any attempt 
to enlarge the mandate of the ECB. With the 
best will in the world such a procedure, which 
includes a Convention, an intergovernmental 
conference and the ensuing ratification process 
in all 27 member states, would take at least five 
years. 
One for all, all for one
Stability bonds: The idea of creating a common 
market for bonds in Europe on the model of 
the US and the Treasury Bonds was already 
being talked about long before the outbreak of 
the euro crisis. The advantages of a large bond 
market of this kind, so the thinking goes, are 
the economies of scale that can be achieved, 
and the lower refinancing costs. Furthermore, 
the size of the market can also afford better 
protection against external shocks and the 
herd behaviour of many investors, which in the 
final analysis has done so much to exacerbate 
the current crisis. And advocates of a common 
bond market believe that it will increase the 
likelihood that the euro will become a genuine 
global reserve currency, and that this in turn 
will be beneficial in all sorts of ways.
With such eurobonds all the debts of the eco-
nomically weak and economically strong euro-
zone countries would be put into one basket, 
and liability for the debt would be assumed 
jointly and for an indefinite period. Pooling 
credit risks, so the thinking goes, will be of 
benefit to the weaker member states because 
they will have to pay lower interest rates. On 
the other hand, stronger states will have to pay 
higher interest rates and shoulder greater risks. 
However, data issued by the European Com-
mission, which were presented in November 
2011 in its “Green Paper on the feasibility of 
introducing stability notes,” have put a damper 
on overly optimistic expectations. It suggests 
that the yield gain of between 10 and 20 basis 
points from a higher issuance volume is fairly 
limited. The Commission believes there are 
situations in which it cannot be ruled out that 
interest rates in what are now low-yield states 
such as Germany, the Netherlands and Finland 
will rise “in the absence of any improvement in 
the credit risk of the current high-yield issuers.”
In legal terms the communitarization of sover-
eign debt in the eurozone is dependent on the 
advent of a political union in which the respon-
sibility for fiscal and economic policy has been 
conferred on the EU and is thus no longer in 
the hands of the member states. This is the only 
way in which budgetary discipline and reforms 
can be implemented and enforced. Even if 
we assume that the political will exists, such 
a step cannot be taken without making far-
reaching amendments to the treaty. They would 
also make it necessary to place the democratic   
legitimacy of the EU on a completely new foot-
ing. This model is of little or no use in the cur-
rent crisis. 
Paying above 60 percent
Blue & Red Bonds. Jacques Delpla and Jakob von 
Weizsäcker of the Brussels think tank Bruegel 
were among the first to unveil a scheme for 
the introduction of eurobonds after the out-
break of the euro crisis. In view of the inherent 
systemic risks they came to the conclusion as 
early as the beginning of 2010 that the liabil-
ity disclaimer for the debts of other eurozone 
countries was no longer tenable. In fact they 
predicted that the Greek liquidity crisis would 
affect the banking sector and mushroom into s
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The allocation of blue bonds will be dealt with 
on an annual basis by an independent stabil-
ity council. The national parliaments will then 
vote on whether or not to accept its proposals.   
If a country does not give its assent to the pro-
posals, it will not receive any blue bonds in the 
year in question, nor will it assume liability for 
the new bond issues. Thus the blue bond issues 
stand and fall with the willingness of the more 
stable countries to shoulder the burden of more 
risk and liability. The authors have no more 
than a rather rough idea of how low or how high 
the yield risk will turn out to be for blue and 
red bonds. But a country such as Italy, which 
has a total debt amounting to more than 130% 
of GDP, would benefit only if the lower yields 
of the blue bonds compensated for the higher 
yields of the red bonds.
On account of the volume of the debt involved, 
which amounts to up to 60% of the sovereign 
debt of the eurozone, these eurobonds could 
not be introduced without amending the Treaty   
of Lisbon.
a European banking crisis with unpredictable 
consequences for the European economy.
However, they were of the opinion that the sov-
ereign debt of the eurozone should not be com-
pletely communitarized, and that only debts 
amounting to 60% of GDP should be included. 
That is the margin which was stipulated in the 
Treaty of Maastricht as a state’s total debt ceil-
ing. These government bonds, or blue bonds, as 
they are called, will have priority status. Since 
they relate to the first (and what one might call 
“healthy”) 60% of a state’s sovereign debt, the 
authors expect that blue bonds will have an 
AAA rating and low interest rates.
Any debt over and above this limit will con-
tinue to be national debt for which other mem-
ber states will not assume liability. In order to 
ensure that the banking sector is not affected if 
the state becomes insolvent, and that in future 
a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis 
cannot reinforce each other and make matters 
even worse, the national bonds (or red bonds) 
are to be kept out of the banking system.
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European government bond yields come under pressure
Interest rates on government bonds in percentage points, January 1993 to June 2012
Source: OECD © Bertelsmann Stiftung
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Paying below 60 percent 
Debt redemption fund: This proposal applies 
only to countries which have not as yet availed 
themselves of any kind of financial assistance, 
and is based on three pillars: a debt repayment 
fund designed to facilitate the temporary and 
limited communitarization of debts; the fiscal 
pact; and an insolvency procedure for states. 
Sovereign debt which exceeds the 60% limit 
stipulated in the Treaty of Maastricht will be 
shifted to the debt repayment fund. The aim 
is to repay it over a period of about 25 years. 
Every country will remain responsible for the 
debt it has outsourced, and will repay it on its 
own. Collective liability will only come into 
play if a country becomes insolvent. Debt will 
not be outsourced in one fell swoop, but over a 
number of years. In this transitional period, the 
so-called roll-in phase, the fund will gradually 
be able to meet the refinancing requirements.  
After this phase has come to an end, the debt 
that has not been outsourced should be on the 
level of the 60% limit stipulated in the Treaty 
of Maastricht. States will be refinanced by 
purchasing one-year to two-year bonds on the 
primary markets. The preconditions for access 
to the repayment fund are the ratification of the 
fiscal pact, which requires the member states 
to incorporate a debt brake in their constitu-
tions, and adherence to strict conditionality (on 
the lines of the conditions attached to the EFSF/
ESM). Among the proposed disciplinary meas-
ures is the suggestion that a country should 
lose part of its access to lower interest rates if 
it is not in compliance with the requirements. 
Furthermore, every country will impose new 
taxes and use the revenues exclusively for debt 
reduction purposes. And on top of this the debt 
redemption fund will be collateralized by 20% 
of the states’ assets, e.g. their foreign currency 
and gold reserves.
The authors are confident that they can insert 
the debt repayment pact into the existing legal 
framework, and cite Article 136 paragraph 3 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), which states that voluntary assis-
tance measures to safeguard the stability of the 
euro are permissible if they are “indispensable” 
and “made subject to strict conditionality.”
 
Ten percent for more liquidity
Euro bills are joint bonds with a one-year 
maturity which have senior debt repayment 
status. They are based on joint and several 
liability. That is why euro bills are especially 
safe bonds. At the same time this would create 
an extremely liquid segment of the bond mar-
ket that banks, which are being compelled to 
increase their capital reserves as a result of the 
Basle III rules, will find especially attractive. 
Furthermore, it would prevent capital flight 
from the bonds of the weaker eurozone states 
into bonds of the stronger eurozone countries.
These short-term bonds would be issued by 
an independent institution which the authors, 
Christian Hellwig and Thomas Philippon, call 
“Joint Debt Management Office.”   This debt 
agency would have the sole right to issue euro 
bills, and would determine quotas on the basis 
of what the member states required. National 
governments would be forbidden to refinance 
themselves on the side by issuing short-term 
national bonds.
Euro bills will be available only to states which 
have invested less than 10% of their GDP in 
such short-term bonds. A further precondition 
for participation in euro bill auctions is that the 
states must be in compliance with the require-
ments of the Stability Pact plus, the six-pack 
and the European semester, the mechanisms 
and agreements with which the member states 
have entered into a commitment to adhere to 
budgetary discipline and structural reforms.
According to their inventors, euro bills can be 
introduced without amending the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The reason for this is the fact that the 
liabilities which will have to be borne by the 
stronger states are manageable, and will exist 
only for a limited period of time.
Thus euro bills are a way of buying time in 
which to launch financial reforms and to regain 
the confidence of the markets. However, if 
things have already reached crisis propor-
tions, and there is a stark choice between joint 
destruction or joint salvation, then euro bills 
may not be of much use.s
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bonds issued by states which have come under 
pressure. For the foreseeable future and in 
the absence of an appropriate new governance 
architecture, which will probably materialize 
and make it possible to introduce eurobonds 
only after the Treaty of Lisbon has been 
amended, this equalization mechanism will be 
able to provide assistance within a short space 
of time. It homes in on one of the main problems 
of the current crisis, and in the stricken coun-
tries will reduce the cost of debt refinancing. 
As in the case of euro bills, the beneficial effect 
of this interest equalization mechanism would 
become less apparent whenever the crisis took 
a turn for the worse, or drove up the costs for 
Germany to a level where it would once again 
become necessary to think about the introduc-
tion of eurobonds or a new mandate for the ECB.
III
Stability has its price
A great deal of thought needs to be given to the 
whole question of whether or not and indeed 
of how eurobonds and their two smaller sis-
ters, euro bills and FIRE, can break out of the 
vicious circle. Everything that has happened in 
the crisis hitherto points to the fact that at the 
end of the day the solution will be a new role 
for the ECB as a “lender of last resort” on the 
lines of the FED.
At any rate, after all that we now know, it will 
be impossible to take the sting out of the euro 
crisis and prevent the contagion from spread-
ing to other states if the powers that be con-
tinue to reject joint and several liability out of 
hand. Rescue measures of a more comprehen-
sive kind than those which currently exist in 
the shape of EFSF/ESM seem unavoidable.
It would be a good idea, and not only from a   
German point of view, to turn the eurozone 
into an economic and stability union before 
proceeding to assume liability for the debts 
of other member states, especially after the 
negative experience of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. However, it may now be too late to put gov-
ernance before liability.
Redistributing crisis profits
FIRE: Friedrich Heinemann of the Centre of 
European Economic Research (ZEW) recently 
presented a rival scheme entitled fiscal inter-
est rate equalization (FIRE). This is designed 
to defuse the crisis of confidence on the 
bond markets and the associated refinancing   
burdens, especially in the case of Spain and 
Italy, by means of a compromise with regard to 
interest rates. The fact is that more and more 
investors are reacting to the crisis by withdraw-
ing capital from countries beset with financial 
problems and investing it in states which still 
have a high creditworthiness rating. 
The latter, including Germany and the Nether-
lands, hardly have to pay any interest at all or 
are actually paid for borrowing money. So the 
idea is that these low-yield countries should 
put some of their savings into a special fund. 
And this fund would help states which the 
markets have punished by demanding higher 
interest rates. However, the scheme is not try-
ing to achieve total equalization, since this   
would deprive the market of its disciplinary 
pricing power. 
Thus equalization will only apply to interest 
rates above 5%. The ZEW has estimated that in 
2012 the fund would need about €6 billion for 
Italy and Spain. And only states where inter-
est rates are lower than 2.5% would contribute 
to the fund. Thus Germany with its 90% share 
would in so many words have to finance most 
of the interest rate equalization scheme. This 
is a significant amount of money, but far less 
than the costs which would have to be met if 
both countries had to seek protection under 
the EFSF/ESM. It is a fact that the guaranteed 
lending capacity of the EFSF/ESM is barely 
sufficient for Spain, and is certainly not large 
enough for Italy. There is a clear need for addi-
tional funding. To date Germany has made a 
commitment to contribute slightly less than 
€170 billion. And this does not include the 
guarantees for Greece.
This kind of interest rate equalization would 
to all intents and purposes resemble the 
repeated ECB purchases on the secondary 
market throughout the crisis of government 7
The stronger eurozone countries would be well 
advised to think more deeply than they have 
done in the past about whether or not it is in their 
interests to prevent the eurozone from falling 
apart. Hitherto Germany has benefited from the 
euro. Thus it has every reason to subscribe to 
what the German Council of Economic Experts 
had to say in their annual report for 2011/12:   
“Anyone wishing to reap the benefits of open 
goods markets must be prepared to face up 
to the instabilities and shocks of globally net-
worked money and capital markets and make 
provisions in the one or other way to protect 
the domestic exporting economy from manifest 
damage. Historical experience shows that as a 
rule this does not come without a price.”
The EU can quite obviously exist without the 
euro. Two member states, the United Kingdom 
and Denmark, have stated that they do not 
intend to adopt it. However, it would no longer 
be the EU which, in the Preamble to the Treaty 
of Lisbon, proclaimed that it was in “the pro-
cess of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe.” Nor would it be the EU in 
which the ongoing evolution of a genuine politi-
cal union is creating the Euro  pean opportuni-
ties of the future in a globalized world. 
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